Additional Time to Move Is Not the Issue with (Im)Mobile Homes: Why North Carolina Needs Statutory Reform to Provide the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant with Adequate Security of Tenure and Security of Investment by Anderson, Chad T.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 92 | Number 2 Article 5
1-1-2014
Additional Time to Move Is Not the Issue with
(Im)Mobile Homes: Why North Carolina Needs
Statutory Reform to Provide the Mobile Home
Owner-Tenant with Adequate Security of Tenure
and Security of Investment
Chad T. Anderson
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North
Carolina Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Chad T. Anderson, Additional Time to Move Is Not the Issue with (Im)Mobile Homes: Why North Carolina Needs Statutory Reform to
Provide the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant with Adequate Security of Tenure and Security of Investment, 92 N.C. L. Rev. 591 (2014).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol92/iss2/5
Additional Time to Move Is Not the Issue with (Im)Mobile
Homes: Why North Carolina Needs Statutory Reform to
Provide the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant with Adequate
Security of Tenure and Security of Investment*
INTRODUCTION .......................................... 592
I. THE MOBILE HOME OWNER-TENANT SCENARIO IN
NORTH CAROLINA. .................................. 594
II. THE MOBILE HOME OWNER-TENANT'S NEED FOR
SECURITY OF TENURE AND SECURITY OF INVESTMENT ....... 598
III. NORTH CAROLINA'S CURRENT STATUTORY SCHEME FOR
THE MOBILE HOME OWNER-TENANT SCENARIO...................601
A. N. C. Gen. Stat. Section 42-14............. ............ 601
B. Other North Carolina Statutes Relevant to the Mobile
Home Owner-Tenant Scenario ..................... 603
1. N.C. Gen. Stat. Section 42-37.1: Defense of
Retaliatory Eviction ................ ....... 603
2. N.C. Gen. Stat. Section 42-14.3: Notice of
Conversion of Manufactured Home Communities.....605
C. What Could Have Been: North Carolina's Flirtation
with Good-Cause Legislation ................ ..... 607
IV. WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE APPROACH TO THE MOBILE
HOME OWNER-TENANT SCENARIO: COMMON-LAW OR
LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . 608
A. Common-Law Solutions to the Mobile Home Owner-
Tenant Scenario .................................... 608
1. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing ................................ 608
2. The Implied Covenant of Security of Tenure or
Good Cause for Termination ......... ...... 609
B. Common-Law Versus Legislative Remedies..... ..... 610
1. General Considerations ............... ..... 610
2. Evaluating Common-Law Versus Legislative
Remedies in the Context of North Carolina................611
V. WHAT SHOULD CONSTITUTE GOOD CAUSE? .......... ... .. . .613
A. The Cost of Good Cause..................... ...... 614
B. Striking a Balance: Finding the Most Appropriate
Formulation of Good Cause.......... .................. 614
* @ 2014 Chad T. Anderson.
592 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92
VI. FOURTH CIRCUIT COMPARISONS ............. ................. 616
A. South Carolina ............................... 617
B. Virginia ........................................... 618
C. West Virginia ................................. 620
D. Maryland ............................. ...... 622
VII. NATIONAL COMPARISONS ............................ 623
CONCLUSION ........................................ ..... 624
INTRODUCTION
This is one of the biggest days of your life, North Carolina
resident. Today you purchased your first home. It is pre-owned, and a
mobile home, but it is yours-something you have invested in and
sacrificed to acquire. It seems things are finally looking up for you.
For one of the first times in your life, the American dream of upward
mobility seems within your reach. However, there is one significant
problem: you do not own the land beneath your mobile home.
Welcome to the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant Scenario.'
It is true that you own the mobile home you purchased, but do
not mistake your ownership for security of tenure.2 It would be wrong
to assume that you are protected from eviction so long as you pay
rent and act in accordance with the provisions of your rental
agreement.3 In reality, the right for your mobile home to remain on its
current lot is subject to the whims of the lot owner.' In North
Carolina, and many other states, so long as you are given proper
notice, the lot owner can evict your mobile home without any reason
at all.' Now, this may seem unfair. After all, you made a substantial
1. See J. Royce Fichtner, Note, The Iowa Mobile Home Park Landlord-Tenant
Relationship: Present Eviction Procedures and Needed Reforms, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 181,
182-83 (2004) (using the 'term "Mobile Home Owner-Tenant" to describe the situation
where the Owner-Tenant owns the mobile home but rents the land beneath it).
2. See Florence Wagman Roisman, The Right to Remain: Common Law Protections
for Security of Tenure: An Essay in Honor of John Otis Calmore, 86 N.C. L. REV. 817, 819
(2008) (using the term "security of tenure" within the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant
Scenario to describe a context in which the "landowner cannot terminate a tenancy absent
a showing of good cause").
3. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-14 (2011 & Supp. 2012) (providing for eviction without
good cause so long as the landlord provides the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant with sixty
days of notice to quit the tenancy).
4. See id.; Manufactured Housing Resource Guide: Protecting Fundamental Freedoms
in Communities, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., 4-5 (2010), http://cfed.org/assets/pdfs
/groundwork.pdf [hereinafter Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities].
5. See § 42-14; see also Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note
4, at 5 (labeling North Carolina as a state without "statutes addressing grounds for eviction
from manufactured housing communities").
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investment when you purchased your mobile home,6 and you
expected that your purchase would provide you with stability and
security. However, in the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant Scenario,
your investment does not buy you security of tenure or security of
investment. To attain security of tenure and security of investment,
you need legal rights and protections. As a Mobile Home Owner-
Tenant in North Carolina, you currently have very few of either.
This Comment advocates for a change of law in North Carolina
that provides the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant ("Owner-Tenant")
with security of tenure and security of investment. Unlike many other
jurisdictions, including every other state in the Fourth Circuit, North
Carolina does not have a statute requiring good cause to evict an
Owner-Tenant. Instead, North Carolina's statutory protection for the
Owner-Tenant is limited to timely notice to quit the tenancy.' The
presumed adequacy of this statutory scheme is based on the premise
that mobile homes are, in fact, mobile, and that granting time to move
is sufficient protection for the Owner-Tenant. However, mobile
homes are generally not mobile,"o and the possibility of eviction
without cause exposes the Owner-Tenant to inadequate security of
tenure and security of investment, which, in turn, results in significant
financial and psychological costs for the Owner-Tenant and his
family." Therefore, North Carolina needs a solution to the Mobile
Home Owner-Tenant Scenario that does more than provide the
Owner-Tenant with additional time to move. In order to provide
sufficient security of tenure and security of investment to the Owner-
Tenant, North Carolina needs a statute that prevents a mobile home
6. See North Carolina Housing Information, MOUNTAINSIDE FIN., https://www
.mountainsidefinancial.com/mobile-home-loan-north-carolina.php (last visited Jan. 4,
2014) (listing the average cost of a singlewide in North Carolina as $33,400 and the
average cost of a doublewide as $67,500).
7. See Roisman, supra note 2, at 818-19; see also Protecting Fundamental Freedoms
in Communities, supra note 4, at 1-2 (describing how the high cost of moving a mobile
home and the precarious rights of the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant combine to deprive
the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant of security of investment). Within the context of this
Comment, "security of investment" describes the context in which the Owner-Tenant has
sufficient financial security in the mobile home to create an incentive to invest in and
maintain the mobile home.
8. See Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 4-5.
9. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-14.
10. See, e.g., Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 1
("Despite the epithet 'mobile home,' today's manufactured homes are not particularly
mobile.").
11. See Roisman, supra note 2, at 820-24.
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community owner from evicting the Owner-Tenant or refusing to
renew the Owner-Tenant's existing lease without good cause.12
This Comment proceeds in seven parts. Part I examines the
current state of the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant Scenario in North
Carolina, concluding that further action is needed to protect Owner-
Tenants in the state. Part II examines why security of tenure and
security of investment are vital to the lives of Owner-Tenants, while
Part III examines how North Carolina's current statutory scheme is
failing to provide Owner-Tenants with these essential security
interests. Part IV considers whether legislative or common-law
solutions are more appropriate remedies within the Mobile Home
Owner-Tenant Scenario, and Part V answers the question of what
should constitute "good cause" to evict. Part VI looks to North
Carolina's jurisdictional neighbors in the Fourth Circuit to determine
whether any of these jurisdictions have adopted statutes that provide
the appropriate balance of "good cause" protection. Finally, Part VII
looks to national comparisons.
I. THE MOBILE HOME OWNER-TENANT SCENARIO IN NORTH
CAROLINA
Mobile home ownership" is pervasive in North Carolina. The
state has the fifth highest percentage of mobile homes in the nation,
with mobile homes constituting 14.3% of the state's housing. 4 Nearly
half of those owning one of North Carolina's 577,000 manufactured
homes live within one of North Carolina's 4,000 trailer parks."
Therefore, a significant number of North Carolina residents find
themselves in the quasi-owner, quasi-renter arrangement known as
the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant Scenario-they own the mobile
home but rent the lot on which the mobile home rests. 6 Because
these North Carolina residents do not own the land beneath their
12. See Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 5.
13. For a discussion of the conditions that determine whether a mobile home is
considered personal or real property in North Carolina, see Manufactured Housing
Resource Guide: Titling Homes as Real Property, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., 14 (2009),
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/manufactured-housing/cfed-titling-homes.pdf.
14. See Mobile Homes, Percent of Total Housing Units, 2008, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/ranks/rank38.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2014).
15. See ALLAN D. WALLIS, WHEEL ESTATE: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF MOBILE
HOMES 16 (1991) (asserting that "approximately 46 percent of all mobile home owners
live in parks"); Bob Geary, Mobile Home Park Residents Caught in Catch-22: Paradise
Lost, INDY WEEK (July 9, 2008), http://www.indyweek.com/indyweek/mobile-home-park-
residents-caught-in-catch-22/Content?oid=1209492.
16. See Fichtner, supra note 1, at 182 & n.2.
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mobile home, they are subject to the many maladies of the Mobile
Home Owner-Tenant Scenario.
A primary problem for North Carolinians living in trailer parks is
that the real estate world treats them as second-class citizens."
Because they do not own the land beneath their mobile homes, they
are not considered property owners."s Instead, their mobile homes are
likened to cars and depreciate in value over time." The fact that these
residents possess hardly any of the legal rights associated with home
ownership is exacerbated by the reality that purchasing a mobile
home still requires a substantial investment, frequently costing tens of
thousands of dollars.20 Therefore, those who frequently rely on
mobile homes for affordable housing-working-class, low-income,
and single-mother families-receive little legal protection or security
in return for their investment.21
An additional problem for North Carolinians living within the
Mobile Home Owner-Tenant Scenario is that the few legal
protections they do enjoy22 are based on the false premise that mobile
homes are actually mobile. Despite the illusory name,
"[m]anufactured housing ... is in fact generally immobile, both
because 'the homes are subject to damage during transportation' and
because 'moving a home is a very expensive proposition and can
easily cost $5,000 to $10,000.' "23 Given that the average price for a
new mobile home in North Carolina is $58,600,24 the cost associated
with moving a mobile home is a significant percentage of the mobile
home's total worth. This fact is exacerbated in the case of pre-owned
mobile homes, which cost less but are often even more difficult and
risky to move due to their age.25 Therefore, the reward for those who
are fortunate enough to have the money to move their mobile home
17. See Geary, supra note 15.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See North Carolina Housing Information, supra note 6.
21. See Fichtner, supra note 1, at 185 (noting that one study found that women headed
forty-three percent of all mobile home households); Geary, supra note 15.
22. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-14 (2011 & Supp. 2012).
23. Roisman, supra note 2, at 822-23; Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in
Communities, supra note 4, at 1 ("Moving a manufactured home typically costs between
$5,000 and $10,000 ... and the move may cause structural damage to the home.").
24. See North Carolina Housing Information, supra note 6 (citing the average cost of a
single wide in North Carolina as $33,400 and the average cost of a double wide as $67,500).
25. See Roger Colton & Michael Sheehan, The Problem of Mass Evictions in Mobile
Home Parks Subject to Conversion, 8 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L.
231, 232 (1999) (arguing that if a mobile home is long established in its current location,
moving it is more akin in process and cost to "moving a single family house than moving a
pickup-drawn travel trailer").
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is that the cost of relocation "severely eats into any home equity the
homeowner may have built up."26
A more common scenario than a loss of equity is that the mobile
home is simply abandoned.27 For example, in Raleigh, North
Carolina, at the Stony Brook North Mobile Home Park, sits an
abandoned mobile home where "vandals have splashed MS-13 gang
graffiti on iridescent green walls and carpeted the floor with broken
Budweiser bottles, crushed among dirty socks and feces." This
mobile home is among the estimated 40,000 abandoned mobile homes
in North Carolina, a number that is expected to double by 2020.29 The
proliferation of abandoned mobile homes is a serious problem for the
state. Homes like those described above pose significant public
health, safety, and environmental concerns, and there is no easy
solution to the problem, as disposal alone can cost $800 to $1,500."
One reason that mobile homes are frequently abandoned
following eviction is that mobile home owners often lack the
resources to pay for relocation. 31 Because mobile homes are a
relatively inexpensive form of home ownership, they are especially
attractive to low-income families and the elderly.32 Therefore, the
demographic that is most likely to purchase a mobile home is the
exact group that is least likely to be able to afford the cost of
relocation. The high cost of relocation may make moving a mobile
home an imprudent investment for any owner to undertake; however,
most Owner-Tenants lack the financial means to even weigh the
merits of moving the structure. For most Owner-Tenants, the decision
will be rather straightforward: no money, so no moving.
26. See Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 1.
27. See Lisa Sorg, Abandoned Mobile Homes Plague North Carolina: Legislation in
the Works While Cleanup Stymies Local Governments, INDY WEEK (Dec. 6, 2006), http://
www.indyweek.com/indyweek/abandoned-mobile-homes-plague-north-carolina/Content
?oid=1199997; see also Abandoned Manufactured Homes, N.C. DEP'T OF ENV'T &
NATURAL RES., http://portal.ncdenr.org/web/deao/recycling/amh (last visited Jan. 4, 2014)
(providing information regarding recycling abandoned manufactured homes).
28. See Sorg, supra note 27.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See Fichtner, supra note 1, at 182 (noting that mobile home tenants are likely to be
single parents or elderly individuals with incomes "below that of the average American
family"); Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 1 ("[I]f the
homeowner is required to leave the manufactured home community ... the only realistic
option may be to abandon the home."); Sorg, supra note 27 ("Owners often abandon
mobile homes in response to socioeconomic pressures....").
32. See Fichtner, supra note 1, at 185.
33. See id.
[Vol. 92596
2014] MOBILE HOME OWNER-TENANT SECURITY
Another reason Owner-Tenants abandon their mobile homes is
because their mobile homes often cannot be moved due to their
condition or because other lots are unavailable.' Many older mobile
homes, especially those fixed in the same location for long periods of
time, cannot be moved because they are no longer roadworthy.35
Though these units are still a viable source of low-income housing, as
a practical matter they cannot be transported.36 Furthermore, many
units that are structurally capable of being moved cannot be relocated
because "many, if not most, parks have strict age and/or condition
restrictions for the units they will admit."37 These mobile home parks
can afford to be selective because demand often exceeds the supply of
available trailer lot spaces.38 For example, in reaction to the closing of
Homestead Village park in Raleigh, North Carolina, a resident of one
of the 160 trailers in the park inquired into availability at nearby
parks only to find that the "nearest park in Raleigh, six miles away,
had two vacancies," and a park "in Wake Forest had four."39 Facing
such steep odds-only six spots existed for the 160 trailers seeking to
relocate from Homestead Village 4 0-it is easy to understand why the
number of abandoned mobile homes in North Carolina is expected to
double by 2020.41
In addition to the issues of relocation cost, roadworthiness, and
the unavailability of other lots, legal restrictions also encumber
relocation efforts and contribute to the abandonment of mobile
homes.42 By ordinance, many counties in North Carolina prohibit
mobile homes manufactured prior to 1976 from being "located,
placed, transported, or otherwise moved" into the respective county.43
Although these ordinances traditionally exempt manufactured homes
34. See Colton & Sheehan, supra note 25, at 232-33.
35. See id. at 232.
36. See id.
37. Id. at 233.
38. See Geary, supra note 15.
39. Id. According to Google Maps, Wake Forest is 18.2 miles from Raleigh. GOOGLE
MAPS, https://www.google.com/#bav=on.2,or.r-qf.&fp=21c4e67242bd37c5&q=Raleigh+to
+Wake+Forest+NC (last visited Jan. 4, 2014).
40. See Geary, supra note 15.
41. See Sorg, supra note 27.
42. See Colton & Sheehan, supra note 25, at 232 ("From a legal ... point of view, they
simply cannot be moved.").
43. See, e.g., Alleghany County, N.C., Ordinance Establishing a Moratorium on the
Location, Placement, or Transportation of Certain Mobile Homes into Alleghany County,
North Carolina from Outside the County (Feb. 24, 2000), available at http://www
.alleghanycounty-nc.gov/ordinances/1-153.pdf; Sampson County, N.C., Manufactured
Home Park Ordinance for Sampson County (Sept. 7, 2004), available at http://www
.sampsonnc.com/mfg-home-park.pdf.
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located in the county prior to June 15, 1976," they have the effect of
narrowing the already slim options available to Owner-Tenants
seeking to relocate. For Owner-Tenants in a county without
vacancies, or even more likely, in a county without a park willing to
accept the mobile home given its age, there may be little choice but to
abandon.45
North Carolina clearly has a critical problem arising from the
Mobile Home Owner-Tenant Scenario: Owner-Tenants are being
afforded the legal protection of second-class citizens and (im)mobile
homes are being abandoned at a rapid pace. Though solving this
problem will not be an easy task, an important step involves adopting
statutory reform that focuses on providing the Owner-Tenant with
security of tenure and security of investment.
II. THE MOBILE HOME OWNER-TENANT'S NEED FOR SECURITY OF
TENURE AND SECURITY OF INVESTMENT
Security of tenure exists for the Owner-Tenant where "the
landowner cannot terminate a tenancy absent a showing of good
cause."46 Good cause takes many forms, but the basic premise of the
good cause requirement, and the related concept of security of
tenure, is that the Owner-Tenant can expect to remain on the
property so long as he meets his obligations under the rental
agreement. 47 Providing the Owner-Tenant with this sense of security
and expectation is vital because security of tenure "is the basis upon
which residents build their lives."48 The expectation of the right to
remain allows Owner-Tenants to "make financial, psychological, and
emotional investments in their homes and neighborhoods." 49 An
44. See, e.g., Alleghany County, N.C., Ordinance Establishing a Moratorium on the
Location, Placement, or Transportation of Certain Mobile Homes into Alleghany County,
North Carolina from Outside the County (Feb. 24, 2000), available at http://www
.alleghanycounty-nc.gov/ordinances/1-153.pdf. This ordinance does not prohibit the owner
of a manufactured home located within the county prior to June 15, 1976, from moving the
manufacture home within the county. Id.
45. This, of course, assumes that the landlord will not permit the mobile home owner
to sell the trailer in its current location. North Carolina is not among the thirty states that
"have some statutory provision prohibiting community owners from arbitrarily denying a
resident the right to sell the home on-site." Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in
Communities, supra note 4, at 6. Though it is not discussed in this Comment, protection
from arbitrary denial of sale is a vitally important legal right that North Carolina law does
not currently provide.
46. Roisman, supra note 2, at 819.
47. See id.; Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 5.
48. Roisman, supra note 2, at 820.
49. Id.
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individual with security of tenure enjoys the accompanying benefits
associated with the concept of traditional homeownership, including a
sense of autonomy and stability.50 In other words, providing the
Owner-Tenant with security of tenure is important, not only for the
individual well-being of the Owner-Tenant, but also for society at
large because the Owner-Tenant with security of tenure has the
incentive to invest in his community and the infrastructure within it."
Without security of tenure, the Owner-Tenant is subject to
involuntary displacement. 52  An individual who is subject to
involuntary displacement does not have the incentive to invest
emotionally, psychologically, or socially in his community because
involuntary displacement constantly threatens to disrupt these
connections." The negative externalities of this residential instability
are far-reaching.54 With regard to education, involuntary
displacement produces highly transient classrooms, which in turn
result in school instability, as both transient students and their
classmates are forced to deal with the "serious educational and social
disruptions" associated with a high turnover educational
environment." In the elderly population, which is one of the most
prevalent demographics within the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant
Scenario,56 the stress of involuntary displacement can result in illness
and death." In the current housing context, where the waitlist for
public housing and Section 8 vouchers can be years, the loss of a
mobile home by poor individuals "may mean literal homelessness."59
This in turn may "lead to [the] division of families, with children
wrested from their parents' custody to be institutionalized or placed
into foster care."60 Given the strong connection between resident and
home, displacement from one's home has been shown to trigger a
grief response in line with that seen in reaction to the loss of a
50. See id. at 821.
51. See id. at 820.
52. See id. at 821.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 821-24.
55. See id. at 822 (quoting Todd Michael Franke & Chester Hartman, Student
Mobility: How Some Children Get Left Behind, 72 J. NEGRO EDUC. 1, 1 (2003)).
56. See Fichtner, supra note 1, at 185.
57. See Roisman, supra note 2, at 822.
58. See, e.g., Maryalice Gill, Waiting List for Public Housing Can Stretch on for Years,
THE TELEGRAPH (Sept. 16, 2012), http://www.nashuatelegraph.com/news/975533-196
/waiting-list-for-public-housing-can-stretch.html.
59. See Roisman, supra note 2, at 823.
60. See id.
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person.6 1 In short, being subject to involuntary displacement creates a
heavy emotional, social, and psychological burden that threatens the
mental health of the Owner-Tenant.62
Deriving from and existing within the concept of security of
tenure is the concept of security of investment.63 For the purposes of
this Comment, security of investment describes the condition where
the Owner-Tenant's investment in the mobile home is protected from
significant economic loss due to involuntary displacement. In this
context, the Owner-Tenant has an incentive to invest financially in
maintaining his mobile home and community.' Security of tenure
provides security of financial investment because it allows the Owner-
Tenant to be confident that improvements to, or investments in, the
mobile home will not be wasted due to involuntary displacement.s
Without security of tenure, there is no security of investment because
involuntary displacement poses the constant threat of significant
economic loss in the form of mobile home relocation or
abandonment. 6
Considering North Carolina's current crisis with abandoned
mobile homes,7 the state is in dire need of policy that provides the
Owner-Tenant with an incentive to invest in, maintain, and not
abandon his mobile home. Policies that provide security of tenure and
security of investment should ameliorate the abandonment crisis
because experience has shown that mobile home owners with
increased security in the mobile home park are more likely to invest
in and improve the park and their homes.68 Therefore, security of
investment is an important concept because its attainment provides a
61. See id. at 824.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 820 (discussing how security of tenure enables individuals to make
financial investments in their homes and communities).
64. See id.; Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 2.
Though "security of financial investment" is clearly a byproduct of security of tenure, and
is not discussed as a separate concept by Professor Roisman, given the high cost of
relocation, the substantial purchase price of a mobile home, and North Carolina's specific
issue with abandoned mobile homes, the concept deserves its own name and a separate
discussion.
65. See Roisman, supra note 2, at 822.
66. See id. at 822-23.
67. See discussion supra Part I.
68. See Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 2
("[W]hen residents own a manufactured housing community, they invest in it. They repave
the roads, fix the sewer system, repair and repaint outbuildings and add landscaping and
amenities."). Though owning the community itself is a higher form of security of tenure
than "good cause" protection, the concept demonstrates that people will invest in their
homes when they have the security of benefiting from the investment.
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potential remedy to North Carolina's issue with mobile home
abandonment. In addition, each of the negative externalities outlined
above demonstrates the need for security of tenure. Because many of
the problems associated with the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant
Scenario derive from a lack of security of tenure and security of
investment, any solution to the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant
Scenario should be measured, at least in part, by the degree to which
the solution provides these securities.
III. NORTH CAROLINA'S CURRENT STATUTORY SCHEME FOR THE
MOBILE HOME OWNER-TENANT SCENARIO
Thirty-three states currently have statutory provisions limiting
the grounds for eviction of residents from a mobile home community;
North Carolina is not one of them.'9 What constitutes a legitimate
basis for eviction within these states varies widely.70 Some states have
"full-fledged good cause statutes, prohibiting the community owner
from terminating the lease or refusing to renew it except for good
cause such as failure to pay rent or violation of community rules,""
and others have statutes that are unclear or simply require "any
legitimate business reason."72 However, North Carolina does not fall
anywhere within this spectrum of good cause. Instead, North
Carolina is among the minority of states that do not have a statute
that addresses the grounds for eviction from a mobile home
community.74
A. N.C. Gen. Stat. Section 42-14
Pursuant to section 42-14 of the North Carolina General
Statutes, "where the tenancy involves only the rental of a space for a
manufactured home ... a notice to quit must be given at least 60 days
before the end of the current rental period, regardless of the term of
the tenancy."s7 Thus, once notice to quit is given, all that stands
between the Owner-Tenant and forced relocation or abandonment is
approximately two months. 76 The landowner does not need cause to
69. See id. at 4, 8 n.7.
70. See id. at 4-5.
71. Id.; see, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1476(B) (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
25, § 7010(a) (2009); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8A-202 (LexisNexis 2010).
72. See Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 4-5; see,
e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.50:1 (2012).
73. See Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 5.
74. See id.
75. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-14 (2011 & Supp. 2012).
76. See id.
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evict, and the Owner-Tenant need not have violated the rental
agreement; all that is needed is timely notice to quit."
In at least one way, the current version of section 42-14 is an
improvement on its pre-2005 counterpart, which required only thirty
days' notice to quit a tenancy involving only the rental of a space for a
manufactured home.18  Providing the Owner-Tenant with an
additional thirty days to move likely aided some individuals with the
financial means and opportunity to relocate their mobile homes.
However, given the high cost and limited opportunities for
relocation,79 the time extension has likely provided very little real-
world benefit to the majority of Owner-Tenants because it is based on
the false premise that mobile homes are in fact mobile.80 In reality,
additional time to move is not the issue with (im)mobile homes, as
most Owner-Tenants are unable to relocate their homes regardless of
the time given.
Though the 2005 amendment shows that the North Carolina
legislature is willing to pursue solutions to the Mobile Home Owner-
Tenant Scenario, the General Assembly chose an inadequate remedy.
North Carolina residents living under the present version of section
42-14 have inadequate security of tenure and security of investment
because the law provides landowners with the power to evict them
and their mobile homes with no good cause requirement and only
sixty days' notice as protection.82 Moreover, the constant threat of
involuntary displacement created by the inadequacy of section 42-14
exposes the state to the negative consequences associated with a lack
of security of tenure and security of investment." With this statutory
scheme, there is very little reason for North Carolina Owner-Tenants
to invest in, improve, or maintain their mobile homes because their
investment can so easily be lost. The disincentives created by this
dynamic likely contribute significantly to North Carolina's crisis with
abandoned homes.'
77. See id. Section 42-37.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes offers the Owner-
Tenant some protection in the form of the defense of retaliatory eviction, but the fact
remains that the landlord can evict without good cause. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-37.1
(2011).
78. See Act of Aug. 22, 2005, 291, § 1, 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 1094, 1094 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-14 (2011 & Supp. 2012)).
79. See discussion supra Part I.
80. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
81. See discussion supra Part I.
82. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-14 (2011 & Supp. 2012).
83. See discussion supra Part II.
84. See discussion supra Part I.
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B. Other North Carolina Statutes Relevant to the Mobile Home
Owner- Tenant Scenario
Section 42-14 is not the only North Carolina statute that affects
legal rights within the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant Scenario.
Therefore it is important to look to other relevant statutes in order to
determine if they compensate for the inadequacies of N.C. Gen. Stat.
section 42-14.
1. N.C. Gen. Stat. Section 42-37.1: Defense of Retaliatory Eviction
Though North Carolina does not provide affirmative protection
in the form of a statute limiting the grounds for eviction," Owner-
Tenants are protected broadly against retaliatory eviction." Section
42-37.1(a) of the North Carolina General Statutes provides a list of
tenant activities that are protected by law.' The basic idea of these
protections is that the landlord should not be able to evict tenants for
seeking to "exercise their right[] to decent, safe, and sanitary
housing."" Despite these protections, the tenant has the burden of
proving that the landlord's eviction action was substantially in
response to the occurrence of a protected act.89 Moreover, section 42-
37.1(c) provides a list of situations in which the landlord may
nonetheless prevail in a summary ejectment action despite the
protection provided by subsections (a) and (b)." For example, where
there is a tenancy for a definite period of time, the tenant has no
option to renew the lease, and the tenant holds over after the
expiration of the term, the landlord will prevail even if the tenant
85. See Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 4.
86. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-37.1 (2011).
87. Id. § 42-37.1(a). The following are acts protected by section 42-37.1:
(1) A good faith complaint or request for repairs to the landlord, his employee, or
his agent about conditions or defects in the premises that the landlord is obligated
to repair under G.S. 42-42; (2) A good faith complaint to a government agency
about a landlord's alleged violation of any health or safety law, or any regulation,
code, ordinance, or State or federal law that regulates premises used for dwelling
purposes; (3) A government authority's issuance of a formal complaint to a
landlord concerning premises rented by a tenant; (4) A good faith attempt to
exercise, secure or enforce any rights existing under a valid lease or rental
agreement or under State or federal law; or (5) A good faith attempt to organize,




89. See id. § 42-37.1(b).
90. See id. § 42-37.1(c).
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proves the landlord's action was substantially in response to a
protected act.9'
North Carolina's retaliatory eviction statute provides the Owner-
Tenant with some much-needed protection. However, in addition to
the statute's exceptions and its allocation of the burden of proof to
the tenant, the protection from retaliatory eviction provided by
section 42-37.1 does not adequately compensate for the inadequacies
of section 42-14 because it fails to offer the tenant any protection
from a landlord who wishes to evict the tenant on a whim or for
reasons unrelated to the tenant's actions."
It may seem puzzling that a landlord would seek to evict a tenant
who is complying with the terms of a rental agreement, but in fact
community owners "often have a strong incentive to drive out low-
income homeowners to free up lots."" By freeing up lots, the landlord
creates the opportunity to rent his lot to a new resident at a higher
price.94 Or, in the case where the tenant is forced to abandon the
mobile home, section 44A-2(e2) of the North Carolina General
Statutes provides a mechanism for the landlord to acquire a lien on
the manufactured home.9 5 With a lien acquired, the landlord can sell
the manufactured home and recover an amount equal to
the amount of any rents which were due the lessor at the time
the tenant vacated the premises and for the time, up to 60 days,
from the vacating of the premises to the date of sale; and for
any sums necessary to repair damages to the premises caused
by the tenant, normal wear and tear excepted; and for
reasonable costs and expenses of the sale. 6
Because this statute provides the landlord with rent after the home is
abandoned, and because many Owner-Tenants will not pay rent after
the landlord provides notice to quit due to their need to save money
to find new housing, it is very likely liens will constitute a sizable
portion of the mobile home's value. Therefore, this statute minimizes
the economic loss that the landlord would suffer from evicting the old
tenant, thereby enabling the landlord to free up new lots with
minimal risk.'
91. See id. § 42-37.1(c)(2).
92. See id. § 42-37.1(c).
93. Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 4.
94. See id.
95. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-2(e2) (2011 & Supp. 2012).
96. Id.
97. See id.; Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 4.
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In addition to the economic incentives to evict an otherwise
compliant tenant,8 retaliatory eviction protection as it stands is
insufficient because the Owner-Tenant is nonetheless exposed to
arbitrary eviction at the discretion of the landowner.99 For instance, if
the landlord does not like the flowers that the Owner-Tenant plants,
then the landowner can give notice to quit, and the protections
afforded by the defense of retaliatory eviction will not protect the
tenant.'" Although this hypothetical may seem extreme and unlikely,
evictions like this do occur.'0 For example, in Iowa, a judge presiding
over allegations that a mobile home owner had been evicted for
refusing coffee was able to say only, "I'm sorry. There's nothing I can
do."" These examples demonstrate that retaliatory eviction
protection alone is insufficient. Without the addition of good cause
protection, the Owner-Tenant's security of tenure and security of
investment are so precarious that he is "likely to be fearful of taking
any action that would bring [him] into disfavor with the community
owner." 0 Therefore, the economic incentives to evict a compliant
tenant and the potential for arbitrary evictions strongly suggest that
the retaliatory eviction protection afforded by section 42-37.1 does
not adequately compensate for North Carolina's absence of a statute
limiting the grounds for eviction from a mobile home community to
good cause.
2. N.C. Gen. Stat. Section 42-14.3: Notice of Conversion of
Manufactured Home Communities
This Comment focuses on the situation where an individual
Owner-Tenant is evicted. Therefore, a thorough treatment of mass
evictions is beyond its scope; however, mass evictions frequently
occur when manufactured home communities are converted to other
uses.'" In such a situation, section 42-14.3 of the North Carolina
General Statutes requires the owner of the manufactured home
98. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
100. While working at Pisgah Legal Services in Asheville, North Carolina, in 2012, the
author received a call where this scenario was the landlord's basis for eviction. A plain
reading of section 42-37.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes suggests that this
scenario would not fall into any of the protected acts.
101. See, e.g., Lee Rood, Trailer Dwellers Have Few Rights, DES MOINES REGISTER,
July 12, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 13954895 (describing the eviction of an Owner-
Tenant where the tenant's children "made too much noise riding bicycles").
102. See id.
103. See Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 4.
104. See Geary, supra note 15.
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community to give each manufactured home owner notice of the
intended conversion at least 180 days before the home owner is
required to vacate the lot and move the manufactured home."os
Though the Owner-Tenant is afforded more time to relocate in the
case of conversion, mass evictions are only a larger-scale example of
the familiar issues associated with the cost and difficulty of relocating
a mobile home. 06
A solution which has emerged in response to this problem is
resident purchase opportunity law." North Carolina is one of
eighteen states that have enacted some form of resident purchase
opportunity legislation.' North Carolina law currently provides a tax
benefit to community owners who sell the land within a manufactured
home community "in a single purchase to a group composed of a
majority of the manufactured home community leaseholders or to a
nonprofit organization that represents such a group."' Though this is
certainly a great first step, other states have achieved even better
results by enacting further measures to promote the purchase of
manufactured home communities by Owner-Tenants."10 For example,
in New Hampshire, strong purchase opportunity law, combined with
organized lending by community development organizations, has
transformed twenty percent of the state's manufactured home
communities into resident-owned communities."' In addition, studies
suggest that forty percent of the mobile homes within these resident-
owned communities are appreciating in value."2 Given the benefits
seen in states like New Hampshire, North Carolina should examine
and pursue additional purchase opportunity laws. Unlike extra time
to relocate, purchase opportunity is capable of transforming a win-
lose scenario into a win-win scenario. Without purchase opportunity
105. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-14.3(a) (2011).
106. See discussion supra Part I.
107. See Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 5.
108. See Manufactured Housing Resource Guide: Promoting Resident Ownership of
Communities, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., 6 (2011), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf
/manufacturedhousing/cfed-purchase-guide.pdf [hereinafter Manufactured Housing
Resource Guide]. Resident purchase opportunity law "promotes resident purchase
opportunities for manufactured home communities." Id. at 1. In other words, it seeks to
transform residents into owners. See id.
109. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-134.6(b)(19) (2011 & Supp. 2012); Manufactured Housing
Resource Guide, supra note 108, at 11.
110. See, e.g., Ellie Winninghoff, Impactful Returns from Mobile Home Parks, FIN.
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law, only the community owner receives a desirable result, and a large
portion of mobile homes within a park during conversion will likely
be abandoned to satisfy the interests of the landowner."' However,
with purchase opportunity law, the community owner's right to sell
may be slightly impaired, but he still receives a fair price while the
Owner-Tenant receives the full security of tenure and investment
associated with land ownership.
C. What Could Have Been: North Carolina's Flirtation with Good-
Cause Legislation
North Carolina's consideration of the Mobile Home Owner-
Tenant Scenario in 2005 ended with the extension of section 42-14 to
sixty days' notice of eviction,114 but the original version of the bill
would have placed limits on the permissible grounds for eviction of a
manufactured home owner."' Under the original version of the bill,
an Owner-Tenant's lease could only be terminated for one of the
following reasons: (1) failure to fulfill the stipulations of the lease; (2)
failure to pay rent; (3) commission of certain criminal acts; or (4)
condemnation or conversion of the land in compliance with section
42-14.3.116
Had the original version of the bill prevailed, North Carolinians
living within the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant Scenario today would
enjoy increased security of tenure and security of investment because
their landlords would not be able to evict them on arbitrary grounds.
This would have been a significant step toward improving the legal
rights of Owner-Tenants. However, rather than implementing a
statutory scheme that would have provided affirmative protection
from arbitrary eviction, the North Carolina General Assembly settled
for an extension of time to move. Rather than aiding the Owner-
Tenant in staying put, North Carolina saw it best to make it easier for
them to leave. Of course, leaving is not always an option and certainly
is not easy when it involves the relocation of a mobile home."'
Despite the legislature's failure to pass the original bill in 2005,
the silver lining is that good cause statutes are on North Carolina's
radar. Given the 2005 amendment's failure to remedy the Owner-
113. See discussion supra Part I.
114. See Act of Aug. 22, 2005, 291, § 1, 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 1094, 1094 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-14 (2011 & Supp. 2012)).
115. See H.B. 1243, 2005 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2005) (as filed on Apr. 14,
2005).
116. See id.
117. See discussion supra Part I.
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Tenant's lack of security of tenure, and North Carolina's crisis with
abandoned mobile homes,118 the time is right to find a new solution.
In contrast to the current version of section 42-14, future solutions
should seek to address the actual problem with the Mobile Home
Owner-Tenant Scenario-a lack of security of tenure rather than a
lack of time to move.119
IV. WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE APPROACH TO THE MOBILE HOME
OWNER-TENANT SCENARIO: COMMON-LAW OR LEGISLATIVE
REMEDIES?
A. Common-Law Solutions to the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant
Scenario
Though many states have turned to statutory schemes to address
the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant Scenario,120 Professor Florence
Roisman, of the Robert H. McKinney School of Law at Indiana
University, has argued that "common law doctrines provide ample
basis for imposing a good-cause-for-termination requirement on
those ... who rent land on which owners of manufactured homes
place their houses."' 2' In making this argument for common-law
solutions, Professor Roisman has outlined two common-law doctrines
to provide security of tenure to the Owner-Tenant: the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and the implied covenant of
security of tenure or good cause for termination.12
1. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is grounded
in the widely accepted principle that "[e]very contract imposes upon
each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and
its enforcement."123 Applied to the lease between a community owner
and an Owner-Tenant, this doctrine "could provide substantial
protection for tenants faced with termination" 24 because it would
prohibit the landlord from engaging in malicious, vindictive, or
arbitrary evictions.125 For example, where a landowner fails to act
118. See discussion supra Part I.
119. See Roisman, supra note 2, at 820-22.
120. See Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 5.
121. Roisman, supra note 2, at 836.
122. See id. at 843, 849.
123. See id. at 843 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981)).
124. See id. at 849.
125. See id. at 848.
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fairly, and in good faith, by taking undue advantage of an Owner-
Tenant, a judge could apply the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing so that the Owner-Tenant would be able to enjoy the
benefits of the rental agreement without being exposed to
opportunistic or vindictive landlord behavior.12 6
2. The Implied Covenant of Security of Tenure or Good Cause for
Termination
On similar grounds to those giving rise to common-law
development of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
Professor Roisman argues that "courts should recognize and apply an
implied-in-law covenant of secure tenure absent good cause for
termination."l 27 In support of this doctrine is Shell Oil Co. v.
Marinello," where the New Jersey Supreme Court voided a
commercial lease provision giving Shell Oil the absolute right to
terminate a lease with only ten days of notice.129 Due to "the uneven
bargaining power between" Shell Oil and the opposing party, the
New Jersey Supreme Court "read into" the commercial lease "the
restriction that Shell not have the unilateral right to terminate, cancel
or fail to renew . . . the lease, in absence of a showing that [the other
party] has failed to substantially perform [its] obligations under the
lease."'30 Though the New Jersey Supreme Court acted in the context
of a commercial lease, the disparity of bargaining power that formed
the basis for the court's application of the implied doctrine of good
cause for termination is even more compelling in the Mobile Home
Owner-Tenant Scenario.13
Within the context of the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant Scenario,
judicial adoption of the implied covenant of good cause for
termination would prevent the landowner from unilaterally
terminating, canceling, or failing to renew the Owner-Tenant's
lease. 32 Application of the implied covenant of good cause for
termination within this context would provide security of tenure to
the Owner-Tenant because it would effectively provide the Owner-
126. See id. at 847-48. For example, Roisman cites to situations where the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing has been applied to require the landowner to
provide replacement housing and to prohibit displacement until the end of the school year
or "during notably hot or cold weather." Id. at 847.
127. See id. at 849.
128. 307 A.2d 598 (N.J. 1973).
129. Id. at 603; see Roisman, supra note 2, at 849.
130. See Shell Oil Co., 307 A.2d at 603.
131. See Roisman, supra note 2, at 850-51.
132. See id.
609
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Tenant with "a life estate in the leased property, subject to
interruption only for failure to comply with lease conditions.""'
B. Common-Law Versus Legislative Remedies
1. General Considerations
In certain ways, common law development of equitable
protections for the Owner-Tenant is more desirable than legislative
action in the form of statutory enactment. 3 4 For example, common-
law solutions are more flexible as they provide the opportunity for a
judge to balance the competing interests and distinctions of a case on
its own particular facts.'35 For instance, where an Owner-Tenant has
lived on a lot for a long period of time and has substantially invested
in the property, a judge applying the equitable remedies discussed by
Professor Roisman could craft a solution that recognizes the tenant's
interest in the property. 6 In contrast, where the Owner-Tenant's
tenure and investment are insignificant, the balance would weigh
more in the favor of the landowner's interests.137
Though common-law solutions are more fact-intensive and
flexible, legislative remedies have the advantage of offering more
comprehensive solutions.' In contrast to courts, which can decide
only the issues before them, legislatures can develop comprehensive
solutions due to their ability to "fully consider an issue" through
133. See Deborah Hodges Bell, Providing Security of Tenure for Residential Tenants:
Good Faith as a Limitation on the Landlord's Right to Terminate, 19 GA. L. REV. 483, 537
(1985).
134. See Roisman, supra note 2, at 840.
135. See id.
136. See id. Professor Roisman argues that equitable remedies will allow judges to
balance the following factors:
[W]hether the tenancy is commercial or residential; whether the residential
property is a single-family or multi-family home; whether the landowner lives on
the property; whether the landowner is a large or small participant in the rental
housing business; how long the tenant has lived at that location; how much of a
financial investment the tenant has made in the property; what representations the
landowner may have made about continued occupancy; how many times and for
what length of time the tenancy may have been renewed in the past; how
important continued residence may be for educational, health, religious,
employment, psychological, or other reasons; and how "tight" the local housing
market may be and how difficult and how expensive it may be, for any reason, for
the tenant to secure replacement housing.
Id.
137. See id.
138. See Gerald Korngold, Whatever Happened to Landlord-Tenant Law?, 77 NEB. L.
REV. 703, 706 (1998).
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extensive fact finding.139 In addition, "principles of separation of
powers arguably require that legislatures make policy choices." 140
Thus, like common-law solutions, there are factors which make
legislative remedies desirable within the Mobile Home Owner-
Tenant Scenario as well.141
Therefore, common-law and legislative remedies each have their
relative advantages, which is why the debate between the two is
"perdurable." 142 Common-law solutions are flexible, yet potentially
expose the litigant to arbitrary judicial whims, while legislative
remedies are consistent, yet potentially ill-tailored; the debate
continues. However, there is reason to believe that legislative
remedies are a superior and more probable solution to the Mobile
Home Owner-Tenant Scenario within the specific context of North
Carolina.
2. Evaluating Common-Law Versus Legislative Remedies in the
Context of North Carolina
As discussed, the current allocation of legal rights between the
landowner and the Owner-Tenant in North Carolina weighs heavily
in favor of the landowner because it leaves the Owner-Tenant with no
right to remain on the premises once the landowner provides
adequate notice to quit the tenancy.143 In contrast to North Carolina's
current statutory scheme, a fully enforced implied covenant of good
cause for termination would in effect provide the Owner-Tenant with
a life estate, terminable only for failure to comply with the conditions
of the lease.1" Under this potential solution, the landowner would be
unable to evict the Owner-Tenant absent good cause. Though
preventing the landowner from terminating or refusing to renew a
lease for a manufactured home is desirable because it provides the
Owner-Tenant with security of tenure, this new legal relationship
would constitute a radical transformation of the current allocation of
legal rights within North Carolina's Mobile Home Owner-Tenant
Scenario.
Where reform would result in a drastic departure from the




142. See Roisman, supra note 2, at 839.
143. See discussion supra Part IILA; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-14 (2011 & Supp. 2012).
144. See Bell, supra note 133, at 537.
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legislative action is necessary.145 Judicial adoption of an implied
covenant of good cause for termination might not constitute a drastic
departure from the status quo in a state like New Jersey, which has
already adopted a similar mechanism within the commercial
context,146 or even in a state that already has a statute limiting the
grounds for eviction of a manufactured home. 147 Within these states,
landowners are already on notice that tenants have a general right to
remain. However, as discussed, North Carolina landowners live in a
state where their rights dominate.14 8 Changing this status quo requires
a substantial policy decision that should properly be decided by a
legislative body representing the will of the people.149
Another reason legislative action is more desirable in North
Carolina is that experience suggests it is more likely to produce
results for the Owner-Tenant.5 o As Professor Roisman concedes,
judicial creation of the good cause-for-termination doctrine "has been
essentially non-existent.""' Roisman attributes this fact to litigants
not pressing courts to impose the requirement rather than courts
rejecting the requirement;15 2 however, a more likely reason that
litigants do not seek this remedy is because they do not think it will
succeed. Given section 42-14 of the North Carolina General Statutes
and North Carolina's notice orientation, an Owner-Tenant, even if
aware of the common-law remedies Professor Roisman advocates,
would be reasonable in believing that a court would reject the implied
covenant of good cause for termination argument and instead adhere
to the plain language of section 42-14.153
In the past forty to fifty years, statutes have supplanted judicial
action as the key reform method within the landlord-tenant
145. See id. ("Just cause requirements ... represent such a drastic departure from the
common-law rules that legislative action would be necessary to implement them.").
146. See Roisman, supra note 2, at 849 (giving the example of Shell Oil Co. v.
Marinello, 307 A.2d 598, 603 (N.J. 1973)).
147. See Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 4-5
(discussing thirty-three states with good cause statutes).
148. See discussion supra Part III.A.
149. See Korngold, supra note 138, at 706 ("[Pjrinciples of separation of powers
arguably require that legislatures make policy choices.").
150. See Roisman, supra note 2, at 835; see also Korngold, supra note 138, at 706
("After the initial pathbreaking judicial decisions, legislatures began supplanting courts as
the key reform agents in the field.").
151. Roisman, supra note 2, at 835.
152. Id.
153. In researching for this Comment, the author could not find a single case, or brief
for a case, in North Carolina where either of Professor Roisman's equitable remedies have
been argued or accepted.
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relationship,154 and thirty-three state legislatures have enacted
statutes limiting the grounds for eviction of a manufactured home
from a manufactured home community.'s In addition, North Carolina
has at least considered adopting a statute that would have required
manufactured home evictions to be made in good faith,5 6 which
demonstrates that statutory reform of the Mobile Home Owner-
Tenant Scenario has momentum and is on North Carolina's radar.
Unlike the sparse record of judicial recognition of good cause
protection, broad statutory reform by other jurisdictions provides
North Carolina the opportunity to critically examine the remedies
other states have employed. The degree of protection afforded by
good cause statutes varies widely by jurisdiction, and this variance
provides North Carolina the opportunity to determine what type of
statute strikes the appropriate balance of rights between the
landowner and Owner-Tenant.
If North Carolina judges were to adopt Professor Roisman's
formulation of the implied covenant of good cause for termination,
there is little doubt that Owner-Tenants in North Carolina would
enjoy security of tenure.157 In the meantime, and until North Carolina
is persuaded to adopt a good cause statute, litigators should pursue
common-law solutions. However, as demonstrated above, there is
reason to believe that a statutory remedy would be more appropriate
and probable within the specific context of North Carolina.
Therefore, though the common law may someday develop to provide
the Owner-Tenant with security of tenure, the remainder of this
Comment focuses on statutory solutions to North Carolina's Mobile
Home Owner-Tenant Scenario.
V. WHAT SHOULD CONSTITUTE GOOD CAUSE?
A key goal of any good cause statute must be to satisfy the
public's interest in "maintaining a proper balance between the
landlord's interests in running his business efficiently and the tenant's
interest in retaining his home.""5 s Despite the profound benefit that
security of tenure provides to the Owner-Tenant and society,'59 good
154. See Korngold, supra note 138, at 706.
155. Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 4-5.
156. See discussion supra Part III.C.
157. See Roisman, supra note 2, at 853 ("Just cause standards basically provide the
tenant with a life estate in the leased property, subject to interruption only for failure to
comply with lease conditions." (quoting Bell, supra note 133, at 537)).
158. See Bell, supra note 133, at 537.
159. See Roisman, supra note 2, at 820-29.
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cause statutes can create costs in other areas, and, at a minimum,
constitute a serious intrusion upon the property rights of the
landowner.
A. The Cost of Good Cause
A downside of any good cause requirement is that it is likely to
make private ownership of a manufactured home community less
desirable to landowners.160 Some scholars insist that good cause
requirements will decrease the supply of mobile home communities1 61
and deteriorate the quality of existing communities. 6 2 As discussed,
Owner-Tenants who are forced to relocate their mobile homes
already face limited options, 6 and a decrease in the number of
manufactured home parks in the state would only magnify the burden
of relocation. If the limitations imposed by good cause are so great
that landowners no longer have an incentive to establish and at least
maintain mobile home communities, then good cause protection
could ironically harm the Owner-Tenant by decreasing access to
affordable housing.'" Therefore, the need for balance in this situation
is great, as any statutory solution to the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant
Scenario must provide security of tenure while minimizing the
potential costs of good cause limitations.
B. Striking a Balance: Finding the Most Appropriate Formulation of
Good Cause
The phrase "good cause" can mean many different things, and
protections which constitute good cause exist within a broad
spectrum.'65 At one end of the spectrum is what Professor Deborah
Bell describes as "just cause."'" "Just cause" standards provide "the
greatest degree of tenant security" because they "basically provide
the tenant with a life estate in the leased property, subject to
interruption only for failure to comply with lease conditions."'67
Though "just cause" standards are excellent in that they provide the
tenant with almost complete security of tenure, they impose an almost
160. See id. at 838.
161. See, e.g., Andrea B. Carroll, The International Trend Toward Requiring Good
Cause for Tenant Eviction: Dangerous Portents for the United States?, 38 SETON HALL L.
REV. 427, 447 (2008).
162. See id. at 454-55.
163. See discussion supra Part I.
164. See Carroll, supra note 161, at 447.
165. See Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 4-5.
166. See Bell, supra note 133, at 537.
167. Id.
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unrealistic burden upon the landlord because they prohibit
termination of the lease "even for legitimate business reasons."1
And while it may be true that "[t]he distinction between
'opportunism' and 'sound business judgment' is hard to draw,""69
absolutely prohibiting a community owner from terminating a lease
for a legitimate business reason, such as park conversion, is likely to
produce many of the negative externalities associated with good
cause limitations. 1 0 Therefore, the "just cause" standard does not
strike the appropriate balance between the interests of the landowner
and the Owner-Tenant.
At the opposite end of the spectrum is good cause protection
that limits the grounds for eviction but does not require renewal of
the lease at the end of the term.'71 Though this form of good cause
protection is superior to the mere notice protection seen in North
Carolina, "[a] protection against eviction without good cause is of
little value if the community owner can simply decline to renew the
[Owner-Tenant's] lease without cause."'72 Despite paying rent and
faithfully meeting the obligations of the rental agreement, an Owner-
Tenant living under this type of protection can still be evicted at the
end of the lease for any reason whatsoever. Therefore, this
formulation of good cause also fails to strike an appropriate balance
between the competing interests because it provides inadequate
security of tenure to the Owner-Tenant and allows the landowner to
terminate the tenancy on arbitrary grounds.
Somewhere between the two formulations of good cause
discussed above lies the National Consumer Law Center's ("NCLC")
policy recommendation.173 Under the model policy of the NCLC, a
lease term must be a minimum of two years, community owners are
prohibited from evicting without good cause ("defined as
nonpayment of rent, rule violations, disorderly conduct or criminal
activity"), and community owners are required "to offer the resident
a renewal lease when the existing lease expires except for good
cause."'74 Additionally, to protect the community owner's interest,
the NCLC model policy allows the community owner to "terminate
168. See id.
169. Roisman, supra note 2, at 853.
170. See Carroll, supra note 161, at 447, 454-55.
171. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-47-530 (2007) (enumerating certain acts for which
tenants may be evicted, but imposing no requirement for renewal of the lease).
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residents' leases because of a change of use of the community.""'
This formulation of good cause seems to appropriately balance
competing interests. On the one hand, it provides security of tenure
and investment because the Owner-Tenant has a right to remain so
long as rent is paid, obligations are met, and the park is not converted
to another use. On the other hand, the policy recognizes the
legitimate business interests of the community owner by providing an
opportunity to terminate investment in the community.
Though the NCLC model policy does impose upon the property
rights of the community owner, the policy recognizes that "[b]oth the
landlord and the tenant have property interests" at stake in the
Mobile Home Owner-Tenant Scenario.176 As Professor Roisman
eloquently described, "[t]he issue is not whether to protect property
interests, but rather how to accommodate the competing property
interests of the landlord and the tenant."" The Owner-Tenant has a
property interest in the mobile home, which can be lost due to
eviction, and the community owner has a property interest in the
land. The relevant question here is which interest gives way for the
other. Though the NCLC model policy no doubt requires capitulation
from both groups, it does so in an equitable manner because it
provides security of tenure to the Owner-Tenant without unduly
interfering with the community owner's ability to put the property to
a more profitable use. It therefore strikes an appropriate balance by
protecting the Owner-Tenant without removing all incentive for a
property owner to establish or maintain mobile home communities.
This, the above suggests, is the most appropriate construction of good
cause.
VI. FOURTH CIRCUIT COMPARISONS
North Carolina is currently the only state in the Fourth Circuit
without a statute limiting the grounds for eviction from a
manufactured home community.17 1 Therefore, North Carolina
currently provides less eviction protection to the Owner-Tenant than
Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, or South Carolina.'79 In seeking to
175. Id.
176. See Roisman, supra note 2, at 839.
177. Id.
178. See Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 5. For
comparison to other states within the Fourth Circuit, see MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP.§ 8A-202 (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-47-530 (2007); VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-248.50:1 (2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 37-15-6 (LexisNexis 2011).
179. See Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 5.
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improve the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant Scenario in North
Carolina, it is important to determine whether the statutes of North
Carolina's jurisdictional neighbors should serve as templates for
statutory reform. Such an evaluation requires an examination of
where other Fourth Circuit states' statutes fall within the "good
cause" spectrum."so
A. South Carolina
As in North Carolina, mobile home ownership is pervasive in
South Carolina. In fact, during the 2013 Miss America pageant, Miss
South Carolina introduced herself by saying that she is "from the
state where 20 percent of our homes are mobile because that's how
we roll." 1 However, unlike their North Carolina counterparts,
Owner-Tenants in South Carolina can only be evicted when one or
more of a limited set of grounds for eviction are present. 8 2 Generally,
grounds for eviction include failure to pay rent;1s3 failure to comply
with the law," lease,'18 or park regulations;" and "willfully and
knowingly making a false or misleading statement in the rental
agreement or application."" Though an Owner-Tenant may be
180. See discussion supra Part V.B.
181. Jessica Chasmar, Miss South Carolina Embarrasses Her State with Trailer Joke,
WASH. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/sep/16/miss-
south-carolina-embarrasses-her-state-wasnt-fa/.
182. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-47-530(A) (2007). South Carolina's statute provides that
[a]n owner may evict a resident for one or more of the following reasons: (1)
failure to comply with local, state, or federal laws governing manufactured homes
after he receives written notice of noncompliance and has had a reasonable
opportunity to remedy the violation; (2) engaging in repeated conduct that
interferes with the quiet enjoyment of the park by other residents; (3)
noncompliance with a provision of the rental agreement or park regulations and
failure to remedy the violation within fourteen days after written notice by the
owner. If the remedy requires longer than fourteen days, the owner may allow the
resident in good faith to extend the time to a specified date; (4) not paying rent
within five days of its due date; (5) noncompliance with a law or a provision in the
rental agreement or park regulations affecting the health, safety, or welfare of
other residents in the park or affecting the physical condition of the park; (6)
willfully and knowingly making a false or misleading statement in the rental
agreement or application; (7) taking of the park or the part of it affecting the
resident's lot by eminent domain; (8) other reason sufficient under common law.
Id.
183. Id. § 27-47-530(A)(4).
184. Id. § 27-47-530(A)(1).
185. Id. § 27-47-530(A)(3). This provision provides the Owner-Tenant with fourteen
days to remedy the violation and come into compliance. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. § 27-47-530(A)(6).
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dispossessed due to eminent domain, as a general rule, South
Carolina residents living within the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant
Scenario are protected from eviction so long as they pay rent, act in
good faith, and comply with the applicable law or park regulations.18 9
Despite these protections, South Carolina's statute falls on the
weak side of the "good cause" spectrum because its plain language
does not require a community owner to renew the Owner-Tenant's
rental agreement in the absence of good cause. South Carolina's
statute is vague, and there is little-to-no case law interpreting how the
statute should be applied within the context of renewal. Experience
from other jurisdictions suggests renewal will not be required unless it
is explicitly and unambiguously required by the statute.190 Therefore,
the ambiguity and absence of a renewal provision within South
Carolina's good cause statute likely exposes the Owner-Tenant to
eviction for hold-over at the end of the term.191 This statutory scheme
does not provide the Owner-Tenant with security of tenure and
security of investment because it does not prohibit the community
owner from refusing to renew the rental agreement of an Owner-
Tenant who has met his legal obligations under the rental agreement.
Therefore, though an improvement over the notice orientation of
North Carolina, South Carolina's good cause statutory scheme should
not serve as a template for statutory reform of the Mobile Home
Owner-Tenant Scenario in North Carolina.
B. Virginia
Similar to South Carolina, Virginia's good cause statute provides
that a manufactured home community owner may evict an Owner-
Tenant only under certain circumstances." These circumstances
188. Id. § 27-47-530(A)(7).
189. See id. § 27-47-530.
190. See, e.g., 8 JEROME P. FRIEDLANDER, II, VIRGINIA PRACrICE SERIES:
LANDLORD-TENANT HANDBOOK § 8:9 (2012-2013 ed. 2012) (interpreting Virginia law as
permitting eviction with sixty days' notice and not requiring renewal of a lease despite
section 55-248.50:1 of the Virginia Code Annotated not including lease expiration or
notice as grounds for eviction).
191. This is especially problematic because section 27-47-530 of the South Carolina
Code Annotated provides for eviction due to the presence of "other reason[s] sufficient
under common law." S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-47-530(A)(8).
192. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.50:1 (2012). Virginia's statute provides that
[a] manufactured home park owner or operator may only evict a resident for: (1)
Nonpayment of rent; (2) Violation of the applicable building and housing code
caused by a lack of reasonable care by the tenant or a member of his household or
a person on the premises with his consent; (3) Violation of a federal, state, or local
law or ordinance that is detrimental to the health, safety and welfare of other
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include failure to pay rent, violation of the rental agreement, and
violation of the applicable housing code or law.193 Notably, in contrast
to South Carolina, Virginia park owners are required by statute to
offer "all current and prospective year-round residents a rental
agreement with a rental period of not less than one year."1 94 This
provision makes Virginia one of sixteen states that currently require
leases within a manufactured housing community to be of at least a
certain length.195 Virginia's combination of a one-year provision and
good cause statute provides more protection than South Carolina's
statutory scheme because Owner-Tenants in Virginia have security of
tenure for at least one year.'96 In contrast, Owner-Tenants in South
Carolina receive good cause protection only for the length of the
rental agreement, which South Carolina's statute does not prohibit
from being month-to-month.197
Despite the minimum term advantage described above,
Virginia's good cause statutory scheme suffers a critical shortcoming
in that, similar to South Carolina's, it does not generally require lease
renewal at the end of the term.198 Though Virginia's good cause
statute "does not include expiration of the lease [or] a term's
termination by 60 days' notice [as grounds for eviction],"199 Virginia's
"Termination of tenancy" statute permits a community owner to
residents in the park; (4) Violation of any rule or provision of the rental agreement
materially affecting the health, safety and welfare of himself or others; or (5) Two
or more violations of any rule or provision of the rental agreement occurring
within a six-month period.
Id. § 55-248.50:1(1)-(5).
193. Id. § 55-248.50:1.
194. Id. § 55-248.42:1.
195. See Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 4.
196. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.42:1. South Carolina is not among the states that
require a lease within a manufactured home community to be of a certain length. See
Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 5.
197. See S.C. CODE. ANN. § 27-47-530 (2007).
198. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.46 (2012) (allowing either party to "terminate a
rental agreement which is for a term of 60 days or more by giving written notice to the
other at least 60 days prior to the termination date"). Note however that section 55-248.46
of the Code of Virginia Annotated may require lease renewal under certain circumstances.
Pursuant to that statute,
where a landlord and seller of a manufactured home have in common (i) one or
more owners, (ii) immediate family members, or (iii) officers or directors, the
rental agreement shall be renewed except for reasons that would justify a
termination of the rental agreement or eviction by the landlord as authorized by
this chapter.
Id.
199. FRIEDLANDER, supra note 190, § 8:9.
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refuse to renew a rental agreement so long as sixty days' notice is
20given.200 Commentators suggest that Virginia's good cause statute
"did not repeal or modify the 60-day provision under 'Termination of
tenancy,' " and that, read together, "the new Code section ...
relate[s] solely to what constitutes cause for termination for a reason
... other than 60-day notice to terminate .... "201 Under this
construction, community owners would need good cause to evict
during a lease term but no cause to refuse to renew a lease.202 Though
not binding, this interpretation of Virginia's statutory scheme
demonstrates that it is an inadequate template for reform in North
Carolina. Virginia's one-year lease requirement is a step in the right
direction. However, considered as a whole, the state's statutory
scheme does not provide security of tenure because, similar to South
Carolina, a community owner can refuse to renew a rental agreement
without good cause.
C. West Virginia
Under West Virginia's good cause statutory scheme, an Owner-
Tenant who places a single-section factory-built home upon a factory-
built home site is protected from eviction absent good cause for one
year, and an Owner-Tenant who places a multiple-section factory-
built home is protected from eviction absent good cause for five
years.203 Unlike South Carolina and Virginia, West Virginia's statute
does not specify what constitutes a good cause ground for eviction.204
Moreover, judicial interpretation of the statute's good cause language
is non-existent. Despite this ambiguity, if the grounds for eviction
constituting good cause are found to be similar to those in South
Carolina and Virginia,205 West Virginia's statutory scheme should
provide greater protection to Owner-Tenants than either of the
200. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.46.
201. See FRIEDLANDER, supra note 190, § 8:9.
202. See id.
203. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 37-15-6 (LexisNexis 2011) ("The tenancy for a factory-built
home site upon which is placed a factory-built home that is comprised of one section,
other than a camping or travel trailer, may not be terminated until twelve months after the
home is placed on the site except for good cause. The tenancy for a factory-built home site
on which is placed a factory built home that is comprised of two or more sections may not
be terminated until five years after the home has been placed on the site except for good
cause.").
204. Compare W. VA. CODE ANN. § 37-15-6 (giving no definition of what constitutes
good cause for eviction), with S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-47-530 (2007) (listing the reasons for
which an owner may evict a resident), and VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.50:1 (2012)
(enumerating when a manufactured home park owner may evict a resident).
205. See discussion supra Part VI.A-B.
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aforementioned states. Whereas there is no minimum term provision
of good cause protection in South Carolina,206 and only one year in
Virginia, 21 Owner-Tenants purchasing multiple-section factory-built
homes in West Virginia are afforded five years of good cause
protection.208 This five-year term limit of good cause protection is a
substantial step toward providing Owner-Tenants with security of
tenure.
Despite providing a longer term of good cause protection for
multiple section factory-built homes, there is at least one
circumstance where West Virginia's statutory scheme is weaker than
Virginia's. In Virginia, the purchaser of a used multiple section
factory-built home with six years of tenure in a community would
receive at least one year of good cause protection.209 However, under
the plain language of West Virginia's statute, the same purchaser
would not appear to be provided with good cause protection for any
term at all.2"o This result occurs because West Virginia's good cause
protection is directed at the factory-built home, rather than at the
Owner-Tenant. 2 11 Though the statute's plain language suggests good
cause protection would be afforded to any Owner-Tenant during the
term of statutory protection, once the factory-built home has sat on a
site for either one or five years, good cause protection seemingly
expires.212 Therefore, despite the protection it affords to newly-placed
factory-built homes, West Virginia's statutory scheme seemingly
provides no protection to the Owner-Tenant purchasing a mobile
home with a long tenure in the same community.213
An additional weakness of West Virginia's good cause scheme is
that it explicitly rejects good cause protection for lease renewal.214 At
the end of the statutory term, the community owner may terminate
the rental agreement "for any reason, unless the rental agreement
states that reasons for termination must exist." 2 15 In the context of a
206. See discussion supra Part VI.A.
207. See discussion supra Part VI.B.
208. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 37-15-6(a). West Virginia's single year of "good cause"
protection for single section factory-built homes places it closer in line with Virginia. See
id.
209. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.42:1 (2012).
210. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 37-15-6(a). West Virginia's statute refers to when the
home "is placed" rather than to when the tenant takes possession. Id. As such, it seems




214. See id. § 37-15-6(b)(1).
215. Id.
621
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
newly placed multiple-section factory built home, this explicit
rejection of renewal absent good cause is less troublesome because a
tenant will have at least five years of security of tenure. However, in
the context of a single-section factory-built home, or a long tenured
home, West Virginia's explicit rejection of renewal absent good cause
provides inadequate security of tenure to the Owner-Tenant. In the
former scenario, the Owner-Tenant can be evicted without cause
after a year and, in the latter scenario, the Owner-Tenant can be
evicted without cause at any time. Therefore, despite its strength
within the context of a newly placed multiple-section factory-built
home, West Virginia's statutory scheme is ultimately undesirable on
similar grounds as those in South Carolina and Virginia.
D. Maryland
Maryland's good cause statutory scheme is the strongest in the
Fourth Circuit because it prohibits a community owner from
terminating or refusing to renew an Owner-Tenant's lease absent
good cause.2 16 In Maryland, Owner-Tenants are protected from
eviction so long as they pay rent,2 17 abide by the terms of the rental
agreement,218 are truthful and not misleading in their application for
tenancy,219 and do not commit a violation of law "detrimental to the
safety and welfare of other residents in the park."22 0 Therefore,
Maryland community owners are prohibited from evicting an Owner-
Tenant without good cause.
Similar to Virginia, Maryland community owners are required to
"offer all current and prospective year-round residents a rental
agreement of not less than 1 year." 221' However, unlike Virginia, or
any other Fourth Circuit jurisdiction, park owners are required to
offer "qualified resident[s]" 222 another one-year term before the
expiration of the one-year period.2 1 A qualified resident is
216. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8A-202 (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2012); id.
§ 8A-1101; Marmion v. M.O.M., Inc., 541 A.2d 659, 663 (Md. App.1988) ("Not only does
[Section 8A-202(c)(2)] give qualified tenants the right to demand a one-year lease, it also
place[s] upon the park owner the burden of offering a one-year lease to qualified tenants
at the expiration of each one-year term." (emphasis omitted)).
217. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8A-1101(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp.
2012).
218. See id. § 8A-1101(a)(2)(iii).
219. See id. § 8A-1101(a)(2)(i).
220. Id. § 8A-1101(a)(2)(ii).
221. Id. § 8A-202(a).
222. Id. § 8A-202(c).
223. Id. § 8A-202(c)(2)(i); see Marmion v. M.O.M., Inc., 541 A.2d 659, 663 (Md. App.
1988).
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a year-round resident who: (i) Has made rental payments on
the due date or within any grace period commonly permitted in
the park during the preceding year; (ii) Within the preceding 6-
month period has not committed a repeated violation of any
rule or provision of the rental agreement and, at the time the
term expires, no substantial violation exists; and (iii) Owns a
mobile home that meets the standards of the park.224
The effect of Maryland's qualified resident provision is that park
owners are required to offer a lease renewal unless the Owner-Tenant
has failed to meet the reasonable obligations of a qualified resident.
Unlike South Carolina, Virginia, or West Virginia, the Owner-Tenant
in Maryland has adequate security of tenure because he can expect to
remain beyond the initial term so long as he maintains his legal and
rental obligations.
Because Maryland's statutory scheme prohibits termination or
refusal to renew absent good cause, it fits into the most desirable part
of the "good cause" spectrum.225 It allows the landowner to change
the use of the land with ample notice 26 while permitting a "qualified"
Owner-Tenant to remain so long as the land is used as a
manufactured home community.2 27 In addition, Maryland's statutory
scheme neither exposes the landowner to perpetual occupancy by
uncooperative and undesirable tenants228 nor exposes the Owner-
Tenant to involuntary displacement without cause. 229 It therefore
strikes a reasonable balance between the property interests of the
landowner and the Owner-Tenant. As such, Maryland's good cause
statutory scheme should be a model for reform in North Carolina.
South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia have each taken
substantial steps toward improving the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant
Scenario;23 0 however, only Maryland has provided adequate security
of tenure and security of investment to the Owner-Tenant.
VII. NATIONAL COMPARISONS
Though Maryland's good cause statutory scheme can serve as a
model for reform in North Carolina, statutory schemes from beyond
224. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8A-202(c)(1) (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2012).
225. See discussion supra Part V.B.
226. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8A-202(c)(3)(i) (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp.
2012).
227. See id. § 8A-202(c)(2)(i).
228. See id. § 8A-202(c)(1).
229. See id. § 8A-1101.
230. See discussion supra Part VI.A-C.
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the Fourth Circuit should also be considered. Two excellent models
for reform are Arizona and Delaware. 23 1 A major strength of the good
cause statutes in Arizona and Delaware is that they are clear and
explicit.232 As seen in South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia,
many good cause schemes "are unclear as to whether the community
owner can evade the good cause requirement by simply declining to
offer the resident a renewal lease once the existing lease expires." 233
Arizona avoids this by explicitly providing that "[t]he landlord may
not terminate or refuse to renew a tenancy without good cause." 23 4
Similarly, Delaware's good cause statute clearly provides that "[a]
landlord may terminate a rental agreement for a lot in a
manufactured home community before it expires or may refuse to
renew an agreement only for due cause." 235 The qualified resident
structure of Maryland's statutory scheme achieves the same result,236
but Delaware and Arizona demonstrate how simple and
straightforward an adequate good cause statute can be. Therefore,
due to the protection and clarity of their good cause statutory
schemes, Delaware and Arizona should stand alongside Maryland as
models for reform in North Carolina.
CONCLUSION
North Carolina has a problem within the Mobile Home Owner-
Tenant Scenario that is in dire need of correction: Owner-Tenants are
suffering the costs associated with a lack of security of tenure, and
society is suffering the cost of an epidemic of abandoned mobile
homes. In at least one way, the problems of the Mobile Home Owner-
Tenant Scenario are inherent to the mixed ownership of the
arrangement. Because one party owns the land and the other owns
the mobile home, respective property interests collide when the issue
of the right to remain arises.
Finding the appropriate balance among competing interests in
this scenario is a very difficult task indeed, and it is unlikely that any
solution can provide a benefit for one party without imposing a legal
231. See Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 17-19
(setting out statutes in Arizona and Delaware as sample laws protecting residents from
eviction without good cause).
232. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1476 (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, §§ 7010,
7010A (2009).
233. See Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 5.
234. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1476(B).
235. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 7010(a).
236. See discussion supra Part VI.D.
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and financial cost upon the other. However, the allocation of legal
rights between parties within the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant
Scenario in North Carolina can be made more equitable. Though it is
only one piece of the puzzle for Owner-Tenant's rights," and by itself
will not provide complete protection, a statute requiring good cause
to evict or to refuse renewal of an existing lease would be a
substantial step toward providing the Owner-Tenant with security of
tenure.
Fortunately, North Carolina does not have to be the leader
traveling down an unmarked path to provide this much needed
protection. Instead, North Carolina need only look to the multitude
of other jurisdictions that have protected the Owner-Tenant. States
like Maryland, Delaware, and Arizona demonstrate that effective
good cause statutes come in many forms. Some are complex, and
some are simple and direct, but they are all equally effective if they
provide the Owner-Tenant with adequate security of tenure and
security of investment.
CHAD T. ANDERSON**
237. In addition to the freedom from eviction without good cause, the National
Consumer Law Center outlines three additional protections that are needed within the
Mobile Home Owner-Tenant Scenario: The Freedom of Association and the Freedom of
Speech, the Freedom from Retaliation, and the Protection of the Right to Sell the Home
in Place. See Protecting Fundamental Freedoms in Communities, supra note 4, at 2. Though
it is beyond the scope of this Comment, rent control is obviously another subject which
requires consideration within the Mobile Home Owner-Tenant Scenario. If the landowner
can unreasonably raise rates with impunity, then good cause protection will be of little use
to the Owner-Tenant.
** The author would like to thank Professor Alfred Brophy for his assistance in
developing the topic for this Comment, as well as Elaine Hartman, Joshua Hayes, and the
Board and Staff of the North Carolina Law Review for their tireless editorial assistance.
Thanks as well to Pisgah Legal Services for the internship opportunity that introduced the
author to the plight of Owner-Tenants in North Carolina.
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